The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities. Ashraf created a Signal group for Electoral Committee members, distributed the election instructions, invited questions, and told members outside Chicago that they could participate remotely. Chicago members were instructed to vote in person; members elsewhere could travel to Chicago or vote by phone. This was not a speculative proposal. It was a working practice used in the previous council election.
Ashraf’s August 21, 2022 voting instructions were detailed. Members voting remotely were to write down the candidates they supported, wait for his call, send their ballot image through Signal, and receive confirmation. Ashraf and two assistants were to verify receipt, record the selections on paper, and count that confirmed ballot. For that Majlis contest, each member could select up to five candidates. Ashraf also told participants that the rules excluded him, as election delegate, from casting a vote. Those rules are not identical to every later local Electoral Body contest, but they demonstrate that the organization had already used remote participation, transparent instructions, and a shared administrative channel.
A national election without a national room
In 2025, Fawzy proposed one Signal or WhatsApp group for all twenty-nine Electoral Body members across the United States. The purpose was administrative: participants would receive the same dates, notices, candidate information, and instructions at the same time. This closely resembled the communication approach used in 2022. Abu Amr rejected it.
He first raised security concerns about placing Electoral Body members together in one group. Fawzy replied that the organization already used these platforms internally, and the members selected to administer or vote in a national election needed a consistent understanding of its procedures. Abu Amr then raised the prospect of complaints being posted to the group. Fawzy offered an administrator-only format, which would have made the group a one-way information channel. Abu Amr still refused.
The objection then shifted toward geography. Why, Abu Amr asked, should a member in one American city know who belonged to the Electoral Body in another? That answer treated a national electorate as several separate local rooms. The practical result, according to Fawzy’s account, was that voters could not easily compare whether the same rules, deadlines, and exceptions were being announced across the country.
The contrast with 2022 was not whether Signal was technologically possible. The organization had already demonstrated that it was. The difference was whether the national participants would be allowed a common view of the process.
Four voting sites for fifty states
Abu Amr also sought to concentrate in-person participation around four centers: California, Dallas, Chicago, and New York. Fawzy objected:
“We have 50 states here.”
The burden was uneven. Members living near those cities could participate relatively easily; members elsewhere might need airfare, a hotel, leave from work, and advance notice. A change from remote voting to required travel could affect who managed to cast a ballot, regardless of what each person intended to vote for.
A later internal discussion involving Hatib addressed the effect of forcing members to vote in person in Chicago. He described the possibility of sincere members withdrawing as a protest against a process they believed unfair. His comment is evidence of contemporaneous concern about the voting arrangements, not a completed count of votes that were lost.
The significant point is the before-and-after. In 2022, Ashraf explained an open process and a remote option through a shared Signal room. In 2025, Fawzy proposed a comparable national communications room and was refused; a small set of physical sites became a central question. They made it harder for members in different cities to see the same election as one continuous, uniformly administered process.