Hizb ut-TahrirExposed.
U.S. Election · Chapter 3 of 22

Part II — The Election Breaks Down

U.S. Election

3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.

Ayman Hamed

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility. He was not a newcomer unfamiliar with the administrative files or the expectations attached to a national council position. His older brother, Abu Haitham, had previously served as the American Mu’tamid. Those relationships placed Ayman close to former national leadership and made his subsequent conduct more consequential than an isolated disagreement among ordinary members.

The disciplinary issue preceded the July candidate meeting. The internal record includes a complaint that had already been filed on June 16 and a second written complaint from Hatib Umar dated June 25 concerning Ayman’s statements at a South Chicago gathering on June 23. Hatib wrote that Ayman had criticized the sitting Majlis before assembled members, urged them to participate so they would not repeat the previous election’s outcome, and cast suspicion on why the Amir had called an election. Hatib described the remarks as part of a longer pattern and warned that using an election meeting to attack particular officials was damaging the organization’s internal cohesion. The 2022 election-process document had itself included a special warning against speaking about sitting council members or nominees during the contest and instructed members to report such activity to the Amir, making Hatib’s complaint recognizable within the organization’s own prior election standards.

The dispute also intersected with an existing disciplinary rule. On June 28, Fawzy circulated a notice attributed to the General Manager that people punished above the level of Tanbeeh, or caution, during the previous term could not stand for the Electoral Body in the new term. In the notice, Ayman was listed as having received an Inzar Nihai (final warning, an internal disciplinary notice; under Hizb ut-Tahrir’s administrative rules, a warning remains in effect for six months, and continued negligence can be referred to the Amir for further action), and Ashraf was listed as having received an Inzar, or warning. Fawzy informed the council that those punishments barred them from standing for that Electoral Body election. That restriction concerned eligibility to run; a separate directive the next day addressed Ayman’s participation more broadly.

By June 29, Ayman had received the further instruction. The urgent message addressed to the South Naqib said that two serious complaints had been filed and that, pending a general manager’s decision, Ayman was suspended from Hizb activities and had:

“No involvement in elections in any capacity.”

Fawzy indicated that the instruction was also sent to the election committee. The breadth of the directive matters. It did not merely forbid Ayman from running for one particular office or recommending another candidate. It took him out of election activity altogether while the complaint was pending.

The July 1 Chicago candidate meeting nevertheless put Ayman back into the election. In his July 5 written complaint to the Amir, Hatib described a candidate gathering organized under the Mandub’s direction and alleged that the 2025 delegate had permitted group campaigning and an organized meeting by the Ajhizah. Hatib identified Ayman as a speaker despite the earlier disciplinary record. This was not simply a private conversation between friends: according to the complaint, the issue was the use of an organized election setting and its authority to advance particular nominees.

The contradiction was discussed inside the sitting Majlis as events developed. Irfan asked:

“How is Ayman in this list?”

Fawzy replied that the council would discuss it and that an investigation was still pending. The member who had been expressly barred from participating was again visible in the election process.

The most revealing evidence connecting Ayman to Abu Amr came from Ayman's own written explanation. Ayman had been explicitly ordered to stay out of the election, yet complaints placed him at the center of a July 1 Chicago effort to promote five candidates as a group. When confronted, Ayman explained in writing that he had acted because Abu Amr instructed him to do so, and Fawzy presented that response to the full sitting Majlis. The significance was unmistakable: the election official responsible for enforcing the rules was identified by Ayman as the very person who directed him to participate despite the prohibition, raising serious questions about both men's conduct and their respect for the organization's own rules.

Shirazi also described a personal visit from Ayman during which, according to Shirazi, he was urged to support selected names aligned with Abu Amr's preferred direction. That separate account gave the sitting Majlis another reason to examine how the organized Chicago campaign operated.

Leadership ultimately removed Ayman from the Majlis contest, but the candidates associated with the effort remained. Removing the visible organizer did not reverse whatever advantage the organized campaigning had already created.

Qusay Froukh

Qusay Froukh supplied a separate Chicago account. He described knowing about the campaign effort, expecting to be included, and considering a complaint before local members approached him and the immediate dispute subsided. According to the existing witness account, he later regretted not raising the matter when he saw how other local disputes and resignations unfolded. That account should be assessed alongside the original statement before any identification of the person who warned him is treated as independently verified.

The significance of Ayman’s role was also institutional. He was a former Majlis member with a family connection to a former Mu’tamid, familiar with both the rules and the structure administering the election. The June 29 instruction, the July campaign activity, and the later private “majlis” group make his involvement central to understanding how the Chicago dispute developed.

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4. The Private “Majlis” Group →

In August 2022, Ashraf warned American election participants that campaigning for other nominees would create a favored list and eventually a subgroup inside Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The Election Behind the Curtain

Choose a complete chapter or section.

  1. Introduction
  2. Part I — How the Election Was Supposed to Work
  3. 1. The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow
  4. 2. Fifty States, Four Voting Sites
  5. Part II — The Election Breaks Down
  6. 3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.
  7. 4. The Private “Majlis” Group
  8. 5. Eight Candidates Became Six
  9. 6. Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections
  10. 7. Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed
  11. 8. The Complaints Become a National Case
  12. Part III — Who Controlled the Amir’s Channel?
  13. 9. Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.
  14. 10. Bilal Knew Before Fawzy
  15. 11. Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing
  16. 12. The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer
  17. 13. Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul
  18. 14. Authority Before the Paperwork
  19. Part IV — Preserving the Result
  20. 15. The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide
  21. 16. “Why Don’t You Fire Him?”
  22. 17. Ayman Returns
  23. 18. The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe
  24. 19. The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election
  25. Part V — What the Election Exposed
  26. 20. Inside the Machine
  27. 21. America Was Not the First Warning
  28. 22. The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent
  29. Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.
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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In 2025, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s American branch held an internal election to choose its next national council, the Majlis.

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CHAPTER 01

The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow

The rules were neither unwritten nor newly invented in 2025.

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CHAPTER 02

Fifty States, Four Voting Sites

The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities.

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CHAPTER 03

Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility.

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CHAPTER 04

The Private “Majlis” Group

In August 2022, Ashraf warned American election participants that campaigning for other nominees would create a favored list and eventually a subgroup inside Hizb ut-Tahrir.

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CHAPTER 05

Eight Candidates Became Six

Chicago’s candidate list created a second problem.

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CHAPTER 06

Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections

The Dallas dispute was easier to understand because the violation appeared inside the count itself.

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CHAPTER 07

Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed

Diwan was not only a candidate.

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CHAPTER 08

The Complaints Become a National Case

By the time the election moved toward final approval, complaints had reached the American leadership from Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago.

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CHAPTER 09

Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.

Fawzy communicated with Ata Abu Rashta through the recognized channel used by the American Mu’tamid to reach the global Amir.

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CHAPTER 10

Bilal Knew Before Fawzy

The most damaging concern about the channel did not come from technical metadata.

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CHAPTER 11

Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing

The emails carrying the Amir’s authority contained unusual technical details that raised questions about who was preparing and sending them.

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CHAPTER 12

The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer

Khalid, a senior Hizb ut-Tahrir member based in Chicago, had encountered a similar problem years before the 2025 election.

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CHAPTER 13

Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul

Abu Talha—Mohammad Malkawi—was not an ordinary member hearing the controversy secondhand.

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CHAPTER 14

Authority Before the Paperwork

Three episodes came to embody the same chronology: Abu Amr’s advance knowledge of a channel message, Khalid’s earlier complaint, and the transition to Abdu Rafy as Mu’tamid.

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CHAPTER 15

The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide

By the time the final election result reached Fawzy, the national leadership had already reviewed complaints from multiple localities.

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CHAPTER 16

“Why Don’t You Fire Him?”

The Dallas dispute did not disappear after leadership restored the original result.

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CHAPTER 17

Ayman Returns

Ayman’s case did not end when he was removed from the Majlis contest.

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CHAPTER 18

The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe

After Fawzy refused to sign the election result, leadership still had a problem.

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CHAPTER 19

The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election

The most important institutional fact in the entire story is also one of the simplest.

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CHAPTER 20

Inside the Machine

By this point, the role of the Mandub becomes essential to understanding why the American complaints were so difficult to resolve.

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CHAPTER 21

America Was Not the First Warning

The American crisis did not arise in a vacuum.

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CHAPTER 22

The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent

The American election controversy raises a disturbing question about the men who witnessed serious wrongdoing within Hizb ut-Tahrir and then continued promoting the organization as a model for Islamic revival.

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.

The 2025 American election ended with a recognized result.

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