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U.S. Election · Chapter 11 of 22

U.S. Election

11. Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing

The technical markers

The emails carrying the Amir’s authority contained unusual technical details that raised questions about who was preparing and sending them. Some messages displayed “+0400” beside the date and time, meaning the email used a time setting four hours ahead of the international reference clock, matching the United Arab Emirates rather than Istanbul, where the Amir was based. Later messages displayed “+0200,” matching Germany’s summer time, and one reply contained the German Gmail phrase “schrieb am Mi.”, meaning “wrote on Wednesday.” These details mattered because the correspondence was supposed to represent the Amir’s decisions, yet its time and language settings pointed to different email environments.

These were not merely strange email settings. They raised the question of whether the Amir was actually the person behind the messages. Was Ata Abu Rashta in Germany? Does he even speak German? Was a man in his eighties, based in Istanbul, repeatedly traveling between Turkey, the UAE, and Germany while personally handling the American election dispute? Or were the letters being composed and transmitted by intermediaries? Did the Amir actually read the complaints and approve the responses, or was his name being used to deliver decisions he had never seen? If the party cannot establish who wrote the messages and whose decision they conveyed, on what basis were members expected to treat them as the Amir's personal judgment?

Ossama Matr, also known as Ossama Abu Zayd, is one of the Amir's senior assistants and serves as a Mandoob, a representative exercising authority on the Amir's behalf, much like Abu Amr. Matr played a central role in Abu Amr's appointment and is described by people familiar with the organization's leadership as its most powerful Mandoob, overseeing the collection of millions of dollars annually, particularly from Europe, earning him the nickname “the money man.” His background raises additional questions about the organization's international leadership, including accounts concerning an Israeli passport, attention from German security authorities, his rise through the hierarchy, and his subsequent relocation to the United Arab Emirates.

Those details drew attention to Ossama Matr, also known as Ossama Abu Zayd, a senior assistant to the Amir who lives in the United Arab Emirates. He previously lived in Germany, speaks German, and uses Germany as his base when traveling between the UAE and Europe. His circumstances made him a central figure for the internal review to examine when questions arose about the origins of messages carrying the Amir’s authority, particularly given his relationship with Abu Amr.

These email details were significant because they appeared in communications carrying the Amir's authority while the American leadership was seeking answers to serious election complaints. The UAE and German time-zone indicators, together with the German-language Gmail wording, directed attention toward the intermediaries handling correspondence supposedly originating from the Amir in Istanbul. Combined with the sequence of delayed responses and Abu Amr's advance knowledge of decisions, these details exposed a fundamental problem with the organization's communication structure: the American leadership could not establish who was preparing, controlling, and delivering instructions in the Amir's name.

The writing did not sound familiar

Members familiar with Ata’s Arabic correspondence also questioned the style of several disputed messages. They described Ata’s normal writing as brief, precise, and careful when documenting what someone had reported. Some of the election communications were longer, more defensive, more repetitive, and internally inconsistent.

One witness summarized Ata’s normal style:

“He writes in short. He doesn’t write long paragraphs.”

The concern was not simply that someone else might have physically typed a message for Ata. Senior leaders often use assistants. The deeper question was whether the final text accurately represented what Ata had decided and the information upon which that decision rested.

Members described passages that seemed to contain one concise decision followed by additional language that changed or diluted its meaning. One account concluded:

“Part of it is the Amir and the other part is not.”

Another judgment was even more direct:

“The whole thing is not from the Amir.”

Those were assessments by people comparing the messages with correspondence they believed reflected Ata’s ordinary style. Combined with the timing of Abu Amr’s advance knowledge and the unexplained regional markers, they reinforced the same institutional concern: the American leadership could not independently verify that the words arriving under the Amir’s authority represented an untouched, direct judgment from Ata.

The distinction matters. The investigation did not require proving that one particular person typed every disputed line. The institutional problem existed if a senior representative could know the substance of a ruling before the recognized recipient, if intermediaries could shape what Ata saw, or if messages could be expanded before returning under his name.

Any of those conditions meant that a complaint against a powerful representative could not safely depend upon the same opaque channel.

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12. The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer →

Khalid, a senior Hizb ut-Tahrir member based in Chicago, had encountered a similar problem years before the 2025 election.

The Election Behind the Curtain

Choose a complete chapter or section.

  1. Introduction
  2. Part I — How the Election Was Supposed to Work
  3. 1. The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow
  4. 2. Fifty States, Four Voting Sites
  5. Part II — The Election Breaks Down
  6. 3. Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.
  7. 4. The Private “Majlis” Group
  8. 5. Eight Candidates Became Six
  9. 6. Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections
  10. 7. Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed
  11. 8. The Complaints Become a National Case
  12. Part III — Who Controlled the Amir’s Channel?
  13. 9. Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.
  14. 10. Bilal Knew Before Fawzy
  15. 11. Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing
  16. 12. The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer
  17. 13. Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul
  18. 14. Authority Before the Paperwork
  19. Part IV — Preserving the Result
  20. 15. The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide
  21. 16. “Why Don’t You Fire Him?”
  22. 17. Ayman Returns
  23. 18. The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe
  24. 19. The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election
  25. Part V — What the Election Exposed
  26. 20. Inside the Machine
  27. 21. America Was Not the First Warning
  28. 22. The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent
  29. Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.
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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In 2025, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s American branch held an internal election to choose its next national council, the Majlis.

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CHAPTER 01

The Rules Everyone Was Supposed to Follow

The rules were neither unwritten nor newly invented in 2025.

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CHAPTER 02

Fifty States, Four Voting Sites

The 2022 election offered a recent demonstration that a national election could be administered transparently across distant cities.

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CHAPTER 03

Ayman Was Ordered Out. He Kept Campaigning.

Ayman Hamed was a America-based member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who had previously served on the American Majlis during Fawzy’s period of national responsibility.

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CHAPTER 04

The Private “Majlis” Group

In August 2022, Ashraf warned American election participants that campaigning for other nominees would create a favored list and eventually a subgroup inside Hizb ut-Tahrir.

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CHAPTER 05

Eight Candidates Became Six

Chicago’s candidate list created a second problem.

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CHAPTER 06

Dallas: One Man, Two Votes, Two Elections

The Dallas dispute was easier to understand because the violation appeared inside the count itself.

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CHAPTER 07

Diwan: Accepted, Then Removed

Diwan was not only a candidate.

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CHAPTER 08

The Complaints Become a National Case

By the time the election moved toward final approval, complaints had reached the American leadership from Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Chicago.

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CHAPTER 09

Complaints Went Up. Answers Did Not Come Back.

Fawzy communicated with Ata Abu Rashta through the recognized channel used by the American Mu’tamid to reach the global Amir.

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CHAPTER 10

Bilal Knew Before Fawzy

The most damaging concern about the channel did not come from technical metadata.

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CHAPTER 11

Someone Else’s Settings, Someone Else’s Writing

The emails carrying the Amir’s authority contained unusual technical details that raised questions about who was preparing and sending them.

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CHAPTER 12

The Man Named in the Complaint Delivered the Answer

Khalid, a senior Hizb ut-Tahrir member based in Chicago, had encountered a similar problem years before the 2025 election.

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CHAPTER 13

Abu Talha Goes to Istanbul

Abu Talha—Mohammad Malkawi—was not an ordinary member hearing the controversy secondhand.

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CHAPTER 14

Authority Before the Paperwork

Three episodes came to embody the same chronology: Abu Amr’s advance knowledge of a channel message, Khalid’s earlier complaint, and the transition to Abdu Rafy as Mu’tamid.

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CHAPTER 15

The Letter Abu Amr Tried to Hide

By the time the final election result reached Fawzy, the national leadership had already reviewed complaints from multiple localities.

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CHAPTER 16

“Why Don’t You Fire Him?”

The Dallas dispute did not disappear after leadership restored the original result.

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CHAPTER 17

Ayman Returns

Ayman’s case did not end when he was removed from the Majlis contest.

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CHAPTER 18

The Position Fawzy Called a Bribe

After Fawzy refused to sign the election result, leadership still had a problem.

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CHAPTER 19

The Sitting Majlis Rejects the Election

The most important institutional fact in the entire story is also one of the simplest.

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CHAPTER 20

Inside the Machine

By this point, the role of the Mandub becomes essential to understanding why the American complaints were so difficult to resolve.

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CHAPTER 21

America Was Not the First Warning

The American crisis did not arise in a vacuum.

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CHAPTER 22

The Witnesses Who Knew and Remained Silent

The American election controversy raises a disturbing question about the men who witnessed serious wrongdoing within Hizb ut-Tahrir and then continued promoting the organization as a model for Islamic revival.

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion — The Result Survived. The Legitimacy Did Not.

The 2025 American election ended with a recognized result.

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